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INTRODUCTION
A man visited a spa in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, four different
times in the summer of 2006.1 Each time, he paid to receive and perform
sexual acts with spa employees.2 As a result of this conduct, police officers
executed a search warrant of the spa, and ultimately charged a female
employee, Sun Cha Chon, with prostitution and promoting prostitution.3
Commonwealth v. Sun Cha Chon, 983 A.2d 784, 785-86 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009).
Id.
Id. Because of the degrading history of the term “prostitution,” I confine my use of the word
to two scenarios: when it is used in a direct quotation, and when I am referring to the laws themselves
that are so titled. See Victoria Taylor, Campaign Urges AP Stylebook to Replace Use of ‘Prostitute’ with
‘Sex Worker,’ N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 15, 2014, 12:29 PM), https://www.nydailynews.com/lifestyle/activists-ap-replace-prostitute-sex-worker-article-1.1975176
[https://perma.cc/EX46-X6U6]
(describing an online campaign by sex workers’ rights advocates “urg[ing] the editors of the AP
stylebook . . . to use the term ‘sex worker’ instead of ‘prostitute’”); STELLA, LANGUAGE MATTERS:
TALKING ABOUT SEX WORK (2013), https://chezstella.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/
StellaInfoSheetLanguageMatters.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGB9-WDFV] (describing the word
“prostitute” as “deep-rooted negative and legalistic”). Some contemporary scholars also take issue
with the term “sex work” in legal and policy discourse, because of its ambiguity. See Anita Bernstein,
Essay, Working Sex Words, 24 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 221, 232-34 (2017) (noting that although the
1
2
3
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After paying for sex, the man was not charged with prostitution or
solicitation: in fact, he was not charged at all. On the contrary, police paid
him a total of $180 for the time he spent receiving oral stimulation and
engaging in sexual intercourse with the female employees.4 The man
discussed the sexual encounters with police, who laughed and joked with him
on multiple occasions about the acts.5
Despite having paid for and received sex, the man faced no charges because
he was acting under the government’s direction. The man was approached by
the police earlier that summer after he visited the spa on his own accord and was
unable to afford the cost of manual sexual stimulation. The police asked him to
act as an informant to facilitate the arrests of the women working in the spa.6 In
this way, a customer of the spa was able to purchase sex on numerous occasions,
paid for entirely by the police, and receive additional financial compensation,
without any fear of criminal prosecution.
Luckily, Ms. Chon had a defense available to her. In July 2007, she filed a
motion to dismiss, arguing that the government’s action was so outrageous
that it violated her constitutional due process rights.7 Her motion was based
on a little-known defense rooted in the Due Process Clause called “outrageous

term “sex worker” enjoys support in progressive circles and by international organizations like the
WHO, UN, and Amnesty International, its ambiguity complicates discussions of legalization and
decriminalization). Still other scholars use the phrase “transactional sex,” but this phrase is more
commonly used to describe sex in exchange for payment within the context of a relationship.
Compare, e.g., Frankie Herrmann, Building a Fair and Just New York: Decriminalize Transactional Sex,
15 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 51, 53 (2018) (employing the term “transactional sex” to
describe the behavior criminalized by New York’s prostitution laws), with Kelly Kilburn, Meghna
Ranganathan, Marie C.D. Stoner, James P. Hughes, Catherine MacPhail, Yaw Agyei, F. Xavier
Gómez-Olivé, Kathleen Kahn & Audrey Pettifor, Transactional Sex and Incident HIV Infection in a
Cohort of Young Women from Rural South Africa, 32 AIDS 1669, 1670 (2018) (differentiating
transactional sex from formal sex work when “the exchange is undertaken within the context of a
relationship (no matter how temporary or ambiguous its nature); the negotiation of the terms of the
exchange is neither explicit nor upfront; and those who engage in the practice differentiate their
practice from formal sex work”). I most frequently utilize the phrase “paid sex,” in an effort to limit
ambiguity without engaging a term that is demeaning or discriminatory. In my usage, “paid sex”
refers to any sexual act in exchange for payment within the commercial context as opposed to the
intrarelationship context. For further discussion of the importance of language in describing
commercial sex in different disciplines, see Jill McCracken, Listening to the Language of Sex
Workers: An Analysis of Street Sex Worker Representations and Their Effects on Sex Workers and
Society (June 21, 2007) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Arizona) (on file with the University of
Arizona Campus Repository) and Karen McMillan, Heather Worth & Patrick Rawstorne, Usage of
the Terms Prostitution, Sex Work, Transactional Sex, and Survival Sex: Their Utility in HIV Prevention
Research, 47 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 1517 (2018).
4 Chon, 983 A.2d at 785-86.
5 Id. at 790.
6 Id. at 785.
7 Id.
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government conduct”8 that is recognized in Pennsylvania.9 The trial court
granted her motion to dismiss, and the State appealed.10 In 2009, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the dismissal, agreeing that the
government’s actions were so shocking that they violated Ms. Chon’s
constitutional right to due process of law.11
The outcome of Ms. Chon’s case was not guaranteed: notably, today, the
Outrageous Government Conduct defense is only recognized in a few
jurisdictions.12 The Supreme Court has never invalidated a government
action based on this defense, and even where it is available, the threshold is
often described as extremely high to the point of being nearly
insurmountable.13 Despite being a constitutional test, defendants face very
different outcomes depending on their jurisdiction, and some may not have
the defense available to them at all.
This Comment argues that courts should make the Outrageous
Government Conduct defense available to defendants in circumstances
similar to Ms. Chon’s. Although the defense can be and has been applied in
numerous situations, I argue that it is both useful and easy to apply in one
particular circumstance: cases of sexual relations between government agents
and targets of investigations, where the government’s purpose is obtaining a
prostitution or prostitution-related conviction.
Part I lays out the history and background of the Outrageous Government
Conduct defense by explaining its origins, current status in different circuits
and states, and distinction from the related defense of entrapment. Part I also
explains the types of cases in which the defense is currently used, in both
state and federal courts across the country.
Part II advances an argument that the Outrageous Government Conduct
defense should be available to targets of paid-sex sting operations when police
engage in sexual conduct or enlist confidential informants to engage in sexual
conduct. The Supreme Court has never addressed a case with this fact
8 Although some sources refer to the defense as “outrageous governmental conduct,” I will refer
to it only as I do above, for the sake of consistency.
9 Commonwealth v. Mance, 652 A.2d 299, 303 (Pa. 1995).
10 Chon, 983 A.2d at 786.
11 Id. at 791.
12 See United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1993) (“[T]he doctrine [of Outrageous
Government Conduct] is moribund; in practice, courts have rejected its application with almost
monotonous regularity.”); Michael Tompkins, Public Corruption, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1269, 1282
(2019) (noting that the Outrageous Government Conduct defense, as a due process violation, is not
recognized by most circuits).
13 See, e.g., United States v. Therrien, 847 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 2017) (“A defendant’s claim of
outrageous government misconduct faces a demanding standard, permitting the dismissal of
criminal charges ‘only in . . . very rare instances’ . . . .”); United States v. Garza-Juarez, 992 F.2d
896, 904 (9th Cir. 1993) (describing the standard as “extremely high” (quoting United States v.
Smith, 924 F.2d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 1991))).
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pattern, nor has any circuit court addressed paid-sex sting operations as they
relate to this defense. I argue that police engaging in sex, or enlisting
confidential informants to do so, with the purpose of obtaining a prostitution
or prostitution-related conviction “shocks the conscience,” making it a
violation of due process. I further explain why entrapment, as it stands, is an
inadequate defense to protect victims of these operations. I outline one
jurisdiction’s test for Outrageous Government Conduct in the context of
sexual relationships between police and investigative targets, and I explain
why this test undoubtedly holds that paid-sex sting operations are a violation
of due process. Finally, I discuss the practical implications of extending
Outrageous Government Conduct defenses to all cases of law enforcement
engaging in sexual relationships with targets of paid-sex stings, by arguing
that the Supreme Court should either adopt a bright line rule that this
conduct is outrageous or adopt a test that will ensure it will be.
I. WHAT IS THE BACKGROUND OF THE OUTRAGEOUS
GOVERNMENT CONDUCT DEFENSE?
Throughout the twentieth century, the Supreme Court discussed
Outrageous Government Conduct as a defense to conviction based in the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.14 However, the
Court has not explicitly relied on this test to overturn a conviction since the
early 1950s, instead alluding to it only in hypotheticals.15
The Outrageous Government Conduct defense is often conflated with
entrapment, but there are important distinctions.16 In particular, if the
prosecution can show that a defendant was predisposed to commit the crime
at issue, the dominant formulation of the entrapment defense is entirely

14 See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-74 (1952) (holding that forcible stomach pumping
by police violated the Due Process Clause and operated therefore as a bar to the defendant’s conviction
for narcotic possession); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973) (alluding to a hypothetical
situation for invoking the Outrageous Government Conduct defense under the Due Process Clause).
15 See Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32 (“While we may some day be presented with a situation in
which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would
absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction . . . the instant
case is distinctly not of that breed.” (citation omitted)).
16 See United States v. Al-Cholan, 610 F.3d 945, 949-50 (6th Cir. 2010) (distinguishing between
the entrapment and Outrageous Government Conduct defenses due to the defendant’s confusion
and conflation of them); United States v. Dyess, 293 F. Supp. 2d 675, 683 n.13 (S.D. W. Va. 2003)
(“While conflated in their origins, the doctrines of entrapment and outrageous government conduct
are different and distinguishable.”); see also John David Buretta, Note, Reconfiguring the Entrapment
and Outrageous Government Conduct Doctrines, 84 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1963 (1996) (“The outrageous
government conduct doctrine is a young branch on the tangled tree of the entrapment doctrine—
ill-defined and oozing with ambiguity. It developed out of lower courts’ misapplication of the
entrapment doctrine . . . .”).
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unavailable, regardless of the extent of law enforcement inducement.17 The
Outrageous Government Conduct defense, on the other hand, is not defeated
by a showing of predisposition.18
The availability of the Outrageous Government Conduct defense varies
widely from circuit to circuit.19 The defense is invoked frequently in relation
to controlled substance sting operations, both when law enforcement officers
purchase drugs and arrest the seller, and when individuals are convicted for
their involvement in drug labs run by government agents.20 The defense has
also been invoked when government agents have engaged in sexual relations
with investigative targets, leading both states and a few circuits to fashion
tests determining when this conduct crosses the line into Outrageous
Government Conduct.21
A. What Are the Origins of the Defense?
The Outrageous Government Conduct defense was first recognized by
the Supreme Court in Rochin v. California.22 In 1949, three deputy sheriffs
entered Antonio Rochin’s home without consent.23 They forced open the door
to Mr. Rochin’s room, where he was partially dressed and in bed with his
wife.24 When the officers pointed at two capsules on the nightstand beside
Rochin’s bed and asked whose they were, Mr. Rochin swallowed both
capsules.25 The officers leapt onto Rochin and tried to force the capsules out
of his throat, but failed, instead handcuffing him and transporting him to the
hospital.26 Against Mr. Rochin’s will, the officers directed a doctor to force a
tube down Mr. Rochin’s throat and pump his stomach, making him vomit up
the capsules, which were found later to contain morphine.27 Mr. Rochin was
charged and convicted for possession of morphine.28

17 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 5.2(a) n.4. (4th ed. 2004, Dec. 2019 update).
18 See infra note 81.
19 See infra notes 90–96.
20 See, e.g., Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 783 (9th Cir. 1971) (finding that the
Outrageous Government Conduct defense barred defendant’s conviction for selling bootleg whiskey
to an undercover agent); United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 380-82 (3d. Cir. 1978) (holding police
action in setting up a methamphetamine production site then arresting defendants for their
miniscule involvement violated the Due Process Clause).
21 See infra Section I.C.
22 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
23 Id. at 166.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
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On appeal, the California appellate court found that the officers were guilty
of “unlawfully breaking into and entering defendant’s room . . . unlawfully
assaulting and battering defendant while in the room . . . [and] unlawfully
assaulting, battering, torturing and falsely imprisoning the defendant at the
alleged hospital.”29 Even so, the court affirmed Mr. Rochin’s conviction, arguing
that they were bound by Supreme Court precedent despite a “shocking series of
violations of constitutional rights.”30 The Supreme Court of California denied
the petition for a hearing without opinion.31
At the Supreme Court, Justice Frankfurter penned an opinion
condemning the police officers’ actions as unconstitutional.32 He did not have,
however, a clear constitutional sticking point—a clause that proscribed these
state actions.33 Instead, he turned to the “least specific and most
comprehensive protection of liberties, the Due Process Clause.”34
Acknowledging that the clause is “vague,” and the definition of due process
itself is “not final and fixed,” Frankfurter nonetheless insisted that the Court
had a duty in this case to evaluate a conviction brought about by these police
actions in the context of the clause’s limitations.35 And in exercising that duty,
he held that the police action in this case violated the Constitution and the
Due Process Clause because the law enforcement actions were “conduct that
shocks the conscience.”36 Forcible stomach pumping to attain inculpatory
evidence “is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities,” because it is “too
close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation.”37
In essence, Justice Frankfurter held that police violated the Due Process
Clause because they acted outrageously.
Reading Rochin today, the police conduct looks initially like a Fourth
Amendment question.38 But because it was decided before the Fourth

Id. at 167.
Id. at 166-67.
Id. at 167.
Id. at 166, 168, 172, 174.
See Jane R. Bambauer & Toni M. Massaro, Outrageous and Irrational, 100 MINN. L. REV. 281,
290 (2015) (describing the Rochin holding as the “tentative judicial testing afforded by the vague
promises of due process”).
34 Rochin, 342 U.S. at 170.
35 See id. at 170-71 (“The Due Process Clause places upon this Court the duty of exercising a
judgment, within the narrow confines of judicial power in reviewing State convictions, upon
interests of society pushing in opposite directions.”).
36 Id. at 172, 174.
37 Id. at 172.
38 See Bambauer & Massaro, supra note 33, at 289-90 (“After all, today the facts of Rochin would
easily qualify for a Fourth Amendment challenge, and the evidence used against Rochin would be
excluded on that basis.”).
29
30
31
32
33

546

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 539

Amendment’s incorporation,39 the Court found that the police conduct
violated the Due Process Clause itself.40 Frankfurter’s holding relied on his
and other judges’ instinctive reaction to the officers’ actions, rather than on
any prior legal rule or definition.41
Once Mapp incorporated the Fourth Amendment, the Rochin test fell into
disuse.42 But the Supreme Court revisited Rochin’s rhetoric around twenty
years later.43 In United States v. Russell, the Court cited Rochin when alluding
to a hypothetical situation where due process would preclude a conviction
because of outrageous actions by law enforcement.44 In Russell, an undercover
agent, posing as a representative for an organization interested in the
distribution of methamphetamine, offered to provide the defendant an
ingredient for the manufacture of the drug in exchange for a portion of the
produced drug.45 The agent saw the laboratory where the defendant and
others manufactured meth, and in accordance with their agreement, provided
the extremely rare ingredient in exchange for narcotics.46 The defendant was
ultimately arrested and convicted for manufacturing the drugs, and the jury
rejected the entrapment defense.47 The court of appeals, however, found that
because the agent had supplied an exceptionally scarce ingredient, without
which the manufacture of the drug would have been impossible, the
defendant had been entrapped.48 At the Supreme Court, the defendant
argued that because the agent’s involvement in the drug’s manufacture was so
39 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (“We hold that all evidence obtained by searches
and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state
court.”). This was not the only right that the Supreme Court invoked through the Due Process
Clause prior to Bill of Rights’ incorporation. For a discussion about the enforcement of the rights
against self-incrimination and coerced confessions through the Fourteenth Amendment prior to the
incorporation of the Fifth Amendment, see Bambauer & Massaro, supra note 33, at 290.
40 The Supreme Court has since recognized this explicitly, stating that today Rochin “would be
treated under the Fourth Amendment, albeit with the same result.” Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis,
523 U.S. 833, 849 n.9 (1998). The facts of Rochin today would likely fall under Schmerber, which
noted that even drawing blood can be a Fourth Amendment violation without probable cause.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768-70 (1966). However, it is worth noting that Schmerber
cited to “that sense of justice” Rochin established. Id. at 759-60 (internal quotation makrs omitted).
41 See Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169 (“Regard for the requirements of the Due Process Clause
inescapably imposes upon this Court an exercise of judgment upon the whole course of the
proceedings . . . in order to ascertain whether they offend those canons of decency and fairness
which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples . . . .”).
42 See Bambauer & Massaro, supra note 33, at 289 (describing how “[t]he Rochin test has taken
a beating” since its creation).
43 United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973).
44 Id.
45 Id. at 425.
46 Id. at 425-26.
47 Id. at 423. For a definition of the standard entrapment defense and further discussion of the
defense’s distinction from the Outrageous Government Conduct defense, see infra Section I.B.
48 Russell, 411 U.S. at 427.
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pivotal, a conviction on the basis of the drug production should be deemed a
violation of due process, thus making entrapment a constitutional claim based
only on the egregious nature of the law enforcement conduct.49
The Court said that the defendant misunderstood entrapment, the purpose
of which is not to enable the court to sanction or restrain “overzealous law
enforcement,” but rather to acquit defendants who only violated the law because
they were induced to do so.50 Although the Court held that entrapment is not a
constitutional defense, it did not preclude the possibility of a constitutionally
rooted defense based on overzealous law enforcement conduct. In addressing
this hypothetical future, the Court cited to Rochin, noting, “[w]hile we may some
day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement
agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the
government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction, the instant
case is distinctly not of that breed.”51
Soon after, the Court was presented with another claim of Outrageous
Government Conduct. In Hampton v. United States, an informant for the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) arranged a heroin sale between DEA
agents and the defendant.52 The defendant gave undercover agents a total of
around $650 worth of heroin, on two separate occasions, and was arrested.53 The
defendant argued that the informant had given him the narcotics, and that at
the time, he believed it to be counterfeit heroin.54 He said that he was entrapped
by the informant and agents, who misled him into unknowingly selling heroin
and ultimately arrested and charged him with the crime.55 He was found guilty,
his conviction was affirmed by the court of appeals, and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.56 At the Court, he argued that his conviction was a violation
of the Due Process Clause based on the language in Russell.57
In Hampton, the Court firmly rejected the constitutional claim.58 While
admitting that the government played a larger role in Mr. Hampton’s
conviction than in Mr. Russell’s, the Court held that there was no due process
violation because the Government did not violate any protected right of the

Id. at 430.
Id. at 435.
Id. at 431-32.
425 U.S. 484, 486 (1976).
Id.
Id. at 486-87.
See id. at 487-88 (indicating that Mr. Hampton asserted he was “the victim of entrapment”
in a proposed jury instruction).
56 Id. at 484, 489.
57 Id. at 489.
58 See id. (“In urging that this case involves a violation of his due process rights, petitioner
misapprehends the meaning of the quoted language in Russell.”).
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
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defendant.59 Justice Rehnquist asserted that “[t]he remedy of the criminal
defendant with respect to the acts of Government agents, which, far from
being resisted, are encouraged by him, lies solely in the defense of
entrapment.”60 However, Justice Rehnquist made this assertion representing
only three Justices—a plurality, but not a majority.61 Five Justices,
representing both a concurrence and the dissent, found that there could be an
Outrageous Government Conduct defense founded in the Due Process
Clause, even in circumstances where entrapment did not exist.62 Therefore, a
majority of Justices in Hampton recognized the availability of an Outrageous
Government Conduct defense as conceived in Rochin and Russell.
B. How Is the Defense Distinct from Entrapment?
The entrapment defense developed as a common-law doctrine through
state courts early in the twentieth century, eventually making its way into
federal courts.63 Entrapment was officially recognized by the Supreme Court
in 1932, in the landmark case Sorrells v. United States.64 The defendant in
Sorrells was charged with and convicted of possessing and selling alcohol
during prohibition.65 The defendant did sell a half gallon of whiskey to a
government agent, but he did so only after the agent asked on three separate
occasions, and the first two times the defendant refused.66 The trial court
refused to submit the issue of entrapment to the jury, holding that
entrapment failed as a matter of law.67 The Supreme Court reversed the lower
court’s judgment, holding that the issue of entrapment should have been

Id. at 489-91.
Id. at 490. This conclusion seems rather at odds with Justice Rehnquist’s own dicta in Russell.
See Russell, 411 U.S. at 432 (“[W]e may some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct
of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the
government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction . . . .”). This contradiction has
been described by a lower court judge as Justice Rehnquist “trying to put back in the bottle the genie
he had loosed.” United States v. Dyke, 718 F.3d 1282, 1285 (10th Cir. 2013).
61 Hampton, 425 U.S. at 484.
62 See id. at 495 (Powell, J., concurring) (“I therefore am unwilling to join the plurality in
concluding that, no matter what the circumstances, neither due process principles nor our
supervisory power could support a bar to conviction in any case where the Government is able to
prove predisposition.”); id. at 499 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Justice Powell that
entrapment “is only one possible defense . . . in cases where the Government’s conduct is as
egregious as in this case,” and noting due process as an alternate defense).
63 For a thorough canvas of entrapment’s development as a legal concept in American courts,
see John D. Lombardo, Comment, Causation and “Objective” Entrapment: Toward a CulpabilityCentered Approach, 43 UCLA L. REV. 209, 216-34 (1995).
64 287 U.S. 435, 452 (1932).
65 Id. at 438.
66 Id. at 439.
67 Id. at 438.
59
60
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submitted for the jury to decide.68 Anticipating likely criticism for usurping
legislative power by deriving an entirely new criminal defense, the Court
insisted that its decision was a matter of statutory interpretation—a duty to
avoid “[l]iteral interpretation[s] of statutes at the expense of the reason of the
law and producing absurd consequences or flagrant injustice.”69 The Court
found that reading the statute literally to allow police inducement would
violate “the highest public policy in the maintenance of the integrity of
administration,” which the legislature could not possibly have intended.70
The Court in Sorrells set the stage not only for entrapment as a federally
recognized defense but also for continuing controversy over the relevance of
a defendant’s “predisposition” to commit the crime. The majority opinion by
Justice Hughes asserted that a defendant’s predisposition is necessarily
relevant to any claim of entrapment, saying that a defendant who “seeks
acquittal by reason of entrapment . . . cannot complain of an appropriate and
searching inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition as bearing upon
that issue.”71 If the inquiry into a defendant’s predisposition harms him, said
Justice Hughes, “he has brought it upon himself.”72
In a famous concurrence, Justice Roberts agreed with the necessity for an
entrapment defense but pushed back against lack-of-predisposition as an
element. When a crime is committed because of inducement by a government
agent, Justice Roberts argued, the defendant’s prior bad acts should not come in
at all, because “[w]hatever may be the demerits of the defendant or his previous
infractions of law these will not justify the instigation and creation of a new
crime, as a means to reach him and punish him for his past misdemeanors.”73
The arguments set forth on either side of Sorrells are now expressed as the
two distinct views of entrapment: the approach of the majority, often called
the “subjective approach” or the Sherman–Sorrells doctrine,74 and the approach
of the concurrence, known as the “objective approach” or the Roberts–
Frankfurter approach.75
Id. at 452.
Id. at 446; see also Jessica A. Roth, The Anomaly of Entrapment, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 979, 99394 (2014) (noting that, by relying on canons of statutory interpretation, the Court avoided the “dilemma”
of overstepping its bounds into executive or legislative arenas to develop the defense of entrapment).
70 Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 448-49.
71 Id. at 451.
72 Id. at 452.
73 Id. at 458-59.
74 This name reflects that a number of years later, another famous Supreme Court case embodied
the same division of opinion on entrapment as Sorrells. In Sherman v. United States, Justice Warren held
that when a defense of entrapment is asserted, a defendant “will be subjected to an appropriate and
searching inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition as bearing on his claim of innocence.” Sherman
v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 373 (1958) (internal quotation marks omitted).
75 LAFAVE, supra note 17, § 5.2(b). The “Roberts-Frankfurter approach” designation refers to the
famous concurring opinions of Justice Roberts in Sorrells and Justice Frankfurter in Sherman. See id. § 5.2(b)
68
69
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Federal courts and approximately two-thirds of the states take the subjective
approach.76 To prevail under the subjective approach, a defendant must show
first that the crime was the product of government inducement, and second, that
the defendant was not predisposed to commit this type of offense.77
The Model Penal Code,78 as well as about one third of the states,79 have
adopted the objective approach. The objective approach removes the bar of
defendant predisposition. Instead, it provides for a defense of entrapment
any time a crime was induced by government agents “employing methods of
persuasion or inducement that create a substantial risk that such an offense
will be committed by persons other than those who are ready to commit it.”80
Under this formulation, even a predisposed defendant can bring an
entrapment defense.
The Outrageous Government Conduct defense is similar to the objective
approach to entrapment because it is not barred by predisposition.81 Even the
name of the defense—Outrageous Government Conduct—underscores a
singular focus on the conduct of government agents instead of on the target
of the investigation. But the Outrageous Government Conduct defense does
have distinctions from the objective approach to entrapment—most notably,
in the basis and timing of the defense.
The Outrageous Government Conduct defense is rooted in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses of the Constitution.82 Whether
government conduct is outrageous to the point of violating the Fifth
Amendment is a question of law that must be raised and ruled on in a pretrial
motion, or else it is waived under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

(“There is growing support for the objective approach, variously described as the ‘hypothetical person’
approach or the Roberts-Frankfurter approach.”). Both Justices took the position that “[n]o matter what
the defendant’s past record and present inclinations to criminality, or the depths to which he has sunk in
the estimation of society, certain police conduct to ensnare him into further crime is not to be tolerated by
an advanced society.” Sherman, 356 U.S. at 382-83.
76 LAFAVE, supra note 17, § 5.2(a).
77 Id.
78 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (AM. L. INST. 1985).
79 LAFAVE, supra note 17, § 5.2(b) n.30.
80 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(b) (AM. L. INST. 1985).
81 See United States v. Mosley, 965 F.2d. 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1992) (“The defense of outrageous
conduct is distinct from the defense of entrapment in that the entrapment defense looks to the state
of mind of the defendant to determine whether he was predisposed to commit the crime. . . . The
outrageous conduct defense, in contrast, looks at the government’s behavior.”).
82 U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV; see also Richard Lawrence Daniels, Note, United
States v. Simpson: “Outrageousness!” What Does It Really Mean?—An Examination of the Outrageous
Conduct Defense, 18 SW. U. L. REV. 105, 105 (1988) (“The ‘outrageous conduct’ defense is based on
the due process rights guaranteed by the Constitution.”).

2021]

Outrageous Government (Mis)conduct

551

12(b)(1)-(2) and analogous rules of state criminal procedure.83 Entrapment,
on the other hand, whether subjective or objective, is typically a question of
fact that is considered by the jury.84
Entrapment is not based in the Due Process Clause, nor any part of the
Constitution. As a criminal defense it is unique, because unlike other
standard criminal defenses it is also not based in history or English common
law.85 Rather, the entrapment defense is a product of the twentieth-century
United States: during prohibition, widespread concern about government
agents inducing violations by setting up alcohol operations led to the creation
of the common-law entrapment defense.86 Now all states have an entrapment
defense, primarily through common law.87
Because the entrapment defense is not constitutionally based, states have
the freedom to define it more flexibly, which is part of why there are multiple
distinct formulations of entrapment. The Supreme Court does not have the
power to dictate the test for entrapment, or to overrule state formulations.
C. What Is the State of the Defense Today?
Although the Supreme Court attempted to clarify its entrapment and
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence in Hampton, the confusing outcome left
little guidance for lower courts when adjudicating police inducement and the
Supreme Court has not addressed it since.88 As a result, the Outrageous
Government Conduct defense primarily plays out in lower courts, and to
vastly different outcomes.89

83 See, e.g., United States v. Henderson-Durand, 985 F.2d 970, 973 & n.5 (8th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Duncan, 896 F.2d 271, 274 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Nunez-Rios, 622 F.2d
1093, 1099 (2d Cir. 1980).
84 Zelinger, infra note 191, at 160.
85 See Paul Marcus, Interview, The Entrapment Defense, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 211, 216 (2004)
(“[T]raditional defenses, such as self-defense, defense of others, necessity, and the insanity defense—that
sort of claim in our system comes from the early English common law. . . . That is not true with the
entrapment defense.”).
86 See id.; Lisa McGirr, THE WAR ON ALCOHOL: PROHIBITION AND THE RISE OF THE
AMERICAN STATE 206 (2016) (“The years of constitutional Prohibition . . . introduced some of the
salient aspects of modern criminal law and procedure,” including entrapment).
87 Marcus, supra note 85, at 216.
88 See Stephen A. Miller, Comment, The Case for Preserving the Outrageous Government Conduct
Defense, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 305, 315 (1991) (“The Supreme Court, seeing the confusion wrought by
[Russell], sought to clarify the defense in Hampton v. United States. Yet, the Court’s fractured opinion
only further muddied the waters in the course of confirming the viability of the defense.”).
89 Id. at 319 (explaining how the Supreme Court avoided explaining Outrageous Government
Conduct, thereby “leaving lower courts to develop the contours of the defense.”).
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1. In Federal Court?
Both the availability and the formulation of the Outrageous Government
Conduct defense vary widely from circuit to circuit. On one end of the
spectrum are the circuits that have declared the doctrine dead, entirely
blocking defendants who cannot invoke entrapment from making inducement
arguments.90 Next on the spectrum are circuits that recognize the doctrine,
but maintain an extremely high threshold to trigger it.91 Finally, there are
circuits who maintain the doctrine is “not entirely mummified,”92 but have so
far declined to extend it, calling themselves in one case “the never say never
camp—or at least the don’t-say-never-if-you-don’t-have-to camp.” 93 On the
whole, among the circuit courts, the doctrine is recognized as “often raised
but seldom saluted.”94 In spite of the uphill path to success, most of the
circuits have at the very least recognized the defense as viable.95
Although it is a high burden to prove, the defense has nonetheless been
successful in numerous federal cases, most frequently in drug sales and drug
manufacturing cases. Often the defense is invoked in so-called “reverse-sting
90 Included in circuits that refuse to recognize the defense are the Sixth and Seventh Circuits. See,
e.g., United States v. Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420, 1426-27 (6th Cir. 1994) (refusing to recognize a due process
defense for outrageous police misconduct); United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 241 (7th Cir. 1995)
(explicitly rejecting Outrageous Government Conduct as a defense); United States v. Smith, 792 F.3d
760 (7th Cir. 2015) (“We repeatedly have reaffirmed our decision not to recognize the defense.”).
91 See, e.g., United States v. LeRoux, 738 F.2d 943, 948 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that an
undercover agent’s substantial participation in an illegal enterprise did not violate the Constitution
because it was not “so outrageous and shocking that it exceeded the bounds of fundamental
fairness”); United States v. Stinson, 647 F.3d 1196, 1209 (9th Cir. 2011) (requiring a defendant to
show that police action was “so grossly shocking and so outrageous as to violate the universal sense
of justice” to show a due process violation, and noting the defense is “limited to extreme cases”);
United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 230 (3rd Cir. 1998) (recognizing the defense while
conceding that its’ viability is “hanging by a thread”); United States v. Osborne, 935 F.2d 32, 36 (4th
Cir. 1991) (affirming that the Outrageous Government Conduct defense requires an extremely “high
shock threshold,” and canvasing disturbing cases where “[t]he court’s conscience remained
undisturbed”); United States v. Rodriguez, 603 F. App’x 306, 312 (5th Cir. 2015) (“It is wellestablished in this circuit that a due process violation will be found only in the rarest and most
outrageous circumstances.” (quoting United States v. Tobias, 662 F.2d 381, 386 (5th Cir. 1981)).
92 United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1993).
93 United States v. Dyke, 718 F.3d 1282, 1287 (10th Cir. 2013). For additional circuits that tentatively
recognize the defense but avoid applying it, see Santana, 6 F.3d at 4 (“The historical record makes it
clear, therefore, that the outrageous misconduct defense is almost never successful.”); United States v.
Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264, 1272 (11th Cir. 2007) (Carnes, C.J., concurring) (noting that while the 11th
Circuit recognizes the defense of Outrageous Government Conduct, it is rooted “in . . . speculative
dicta,” and “[t]his Court has not ever reversed a conviction or vacated a sentence” on its basis).
94 Santana, 6 F.3d at 4.
95 Only two Circuits—the Sixth and Seventh—have explicitly refused to recognize the
defense. See Tucker, 28 F.3d at 1426-27; Boyd, 55 F.3d at 241; see also United States v. Mosley, 965
F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1992) (“Notwithstanding the lack of a clear holding on outrageous conduct
by the Supreme Court, most of the circuits, including this one, have recognized the viability of the
outrageous conduct defense.”).
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operations,” when law enforcement officers sell drugs to an investigative target
and arrest the purchasers.96 For example, the Ninth Circuit found a violation of
due process when a special investigator posed as a member of a gang selling
bootleg whiskey; it called the government’s actions “wholly impermissible
participation” and reversed the convictions of both defendants.97
Another formulation of the defense occurs in cases where individuals are
convicted for their involvement in drug laboratories that were set up and run
by undercover government agents. In one such case, United States v. Twigg,
the defendant, Neville, was approached by a confidential informant acting on
DEA agent orders about setting up a laboratory to produce
methamphetamine.98 They planned to divide the work, with the informant
assuming all responsibility for acquiring equipment, ingredients, and a
location for the laboratory.99 The informant did obtain glassware, chemicals,
and a location, receiving substantial financial and logistical assistance from
the DEA.100 At this point, the second defendant, Twigg, who owed a debt to
Neville, was introduced to the informant.101 The laboratory ran for one week,
which resulted in about six pounds of methamphetamine being produced.102
During that time, the laboratory was run completely by the confidential
informant; Neville and Twigg completed only specific and small tasks as
directed by the informant, which included running errands and buying coffee
or groceries.103 Both defendants were arrested after Neville was stopped
leaving with the drugs on his person.104

96 “Reverse-sting” typically describes a set-up where law enforcement officers pose as drug
sellers, distinguishable from so-called “buy and busts,” in which officers pose as drug buyers. See
Gail M. Greaney, Note, Crossing the Constitutional Line: Due Process and the Law Enforcement
Justification, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 745, 757 (1992). The term has also been used when officers
set up a fake “stash-house” or another location to be targets of robbery, and then arrest those who
attempt to rob them. See, e.g., Shayna Jacobs, 10 Years. 179 Arrests. No White Defendants. DEA Tactics
Face Scrutiny in New York, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2019, 8:05 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national-security/10-years-179-arrests-no-white-defendants-dea-tactics-face-scrutiny-in-newyork/2019/12/14/f6462242-12ce-11ea-bf62-eadd5d11f559_story.html
[https://perma.cc/W5QC-HJPE]
(using “reverse sting” to describe federal agents waiting to intercept seven defendants for
attempting to rob “what they believed was a Harlem stash house holding around $800,000 worth
of heroin and cocaine”).
97 Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 784-85 (9th Cir. 1971). But see United States v. Haas,
No. 96-10530, 96-10553, 1998 WL 88550, at *1 (9th Cir. 1998) (expressing hesitation to follow Greene
in other cases, noting in an unpublished opinion that Greene “may be an entrapment rather than an
outrageous government conduct case”).
98 588 F.2d 373, 375 (3d Cir. 1978).
99 Id.
100 Id. at 375-76.
101 Id. at 376.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
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The Third Circuit noted that entrapment was not an issue on appeal for
either defendant because Twigg was not brought into the criminal enterprise
by a government agent and because Neville was predisposed.105 Presented
with two cases of government inducement, neither of which allowed for a
defense of entrapment, the court held that the police conduct was outrageous
to the point of violating the Due Process Clause.106 The court pointed to the
government’s involvement in supplying the necessary ingredients and the
location, at cost only to the government, and to the informant’s role as
supervisor in the laboratory.107 In spite of Neville’s predisposition, the court
held that upholding the conviction was disallowed by principles of
fundamental fairness.108 The Outrageous Government Conduct defense was
granted for both defendants, and both convictions were reversed.109
A final category in which the defense is often presented, and of the greatest
importance to this comment, is when sexual relations occur between
government agents or confidential informants and investigative targets. These
cases typically address situations where undercover agents or informants have
sexual relationships with targets but not to secure a sex-based conviction: for
example, to develop trust, or as a result of a past relationship.110 In response to
cases along these lines, a few circuit courts have developed tests to “identify the
point at which physical contact and emotional intimacy between an undercover
agent and his or her target suspect becomes outrageous . . . .”111
In the Second Circuit, one case involving sexual relationships between
government agents and targets inspired the court to develop a test for this
specific circumstance. In United States v. Cuervelo, the defendant GomezGalvis was charged as a coconspirator in the importation of cocaine from
Panama into the United States.112 Gomez-Galvis alleged that an undercover

Id.
Id. at 380-81.
Id.
Id. at 381.
Id. at 381-82.
See, e.g., United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 234 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that the
Outrageous Government Conduct defense is not implicated by “a one-time sexual encounter
[between an agent and a target] that served no investigatory purpose occurring near the end of an
investigation . . . .”); United States v. Miller, 891 F.2d 1265, 1266, 1268 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding no
due process violation when an undercover agent had previously been sexually intimate with the
target of a drug investigation); United States v. Fadel, 844 F.2d 1425, 1429 (10th Cir. 1988) (referring
to the lower court decision that an agent instigating a sexual relationship while investigating a target
did not constitute Outrageous Government Conduct). For an argument why the Outrageous
Government Conduct defense should apply when undercover officers induce criminal activity or
assistance in an investigation through sex and romance, see Andrea B. Daloia, Note, Sexual
Misconduct and the Government: Time to Take a Stand, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 793 (2000).
111 Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 232.
112 949 F.2d 559, 563 (2d. Cir. 1991).
105
106
107
108
109
110
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DEA agent seduced her, wrote her love letters, and ultimately had sex with
her approximately fifteen times.113 Based on their romantic and sexual
relationship, Gomez-Galvis agreed to help the agent find a drug supplier in
Colombia.114 Ultimately, Gomez-Galvis arranged a meeting for the agent
with a drug dealer in Colombia, whom she had never before helped to sell
drugs.115 She explained that she acted only as a go-between, passing messages
between the two men, but argued that the government’s actions violated due
process purely because of her romantic and sexual relationship with the
undercover agent.116 Gomez-Galvis described this conduct as “sexual
entrapment,” and argued that the government’s actions were a violation of
due process because “[l]egitimate undercover operations can be conducted
without federal agents acting like modern day Mata Haris.”117
In Cuervelo, rather than determining whether or not the government’s
conduct was outrageous, the court established a three-part test that set forth the
minimum for unconstitutional conduct and remanded the case to the lower court
for additional fact finding on whether the standard was met.118 Under Cuervelo,
to succeed on a due process claim pertaining to a sexual relationship between
the defendant and a government agent, the defendant must show
(1) that the government consciously set out to use sex as a weapon in its
investigatory arsenal, or acquiesced in such conduct for its own purposes
upon learning that such a relationship existed;
(2) that the government agent initiated a sexual relationship, or allowed it to
continue to exist, to achieve governmental ends; and
(3) that the sexual relationship took place during or close to the period
covered by the indictment and was entwined with the events charged
therein.119

The same test was adapted by the Third Circuit in United States v. NolanCooper, with a variation: part one requires only that the defendant show that

Id.
Id. at 564.
Id.
Id.
Id. Mata Hari was a suspected German spy in World War I who was accused of sharing
information with the military officers she seduced. Rachel Siegel, ‘I Am Ready’: Mata Hari Faced a
Firing Squad for Spying—and Refused a Blindfold., WASH. POST (Oct. 15, 2017, 3:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2017/10/15/i-am-ready-mata-hari-faced-afiring-squad-for-spying-and-refused-a-blindfold [https://perma.cc/LY5R-KVA6]. Recent accounts
have suggested she may have been entirely innocent of spying and was selling sex because she was
living in poverty after leaving an abusive relationship. Id.
118 Cuervelo, 949 F.2d at 567.
119 Id.
113
114
115
116
117
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“the government consciously set out to use sex as a weapon in its investigatory
arsenal or acquiesced in such conduct for its own purposes once it knew or
should have known that such a relationship existed.”120
2. In State Court?
Defendants have raised the Outrageous Government Conduct defense in
state courts with similar results as in federal courts.121 Notably, unlike in
federal court, state courts have specifically discussed due process as a defense
in paid-sex sting operations many times over the past fifty years. In the 1970s
and 1980s, a number of state courts analyzed the constitutionality of paid-sex
sting operations involving sexual contact, but overwhelmingly found no due
process violation.122
More recently, however, state courts faced with the same issue have found
that sexual misconduct between undercover agents and investigative targets
does cross a constitutional line. In State v. Burkland, a case eerily similar to
Commonwealth v. Sun Cha Chon, an undercover officer in Minneapolis posed
as a customer at a tanning salon suspected of selling sex.123 The officer
bargained for, paid for, and engaged in sexual contact with an employee, who
was then found guilty of prostitution based on the interaction.124 The court
held that
when a police officer’s conduct in a Prostitution investigation involves the
initiation of sexual contact that is not required for the collection of evidence
to establish the elements of the offense, this conduct, initiated by the
investigating officer, is sufficiently outrageous to violate the “concept of
fundamental fairness inherent” in the guarantee of due process.125

155 F.3d 221, 233 (3d Cir. 1998).
See, e.g., State v. Williams, 623 So.2d 462, 464-66 (Fla. 1993) (finding law enforcement
conduct a violation of due process when a chemist for a local Sheriff ’s office manufactured crack
cocaine using powdered cocaine that had been seized to sell in a reverse-sting operation that resulted
in defendant’s being arrested and prosecuted).
122 See, e.g., State v. Tookes, 699 P.2d 983, 987 (Haw. 1985) (“While we question whether the
actions of . . . the police in this case comport with the ethical standards which law enforcement
officials should be guided by, we cannot say that they constituted outrageous conduct in the
constitutional sense.”); State v. Emerson, 517 P.2d 245, 249 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973) (“Although our
opinion should not be misconstrued as a moral endorsement of the means employed to obtain the
evidence . . . we cannot say the trial court erred in using the police agent’s evidence in convicting
the defendant.” ); Anchorage v. Flanagan, 649 P.2d 957, 963 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (“Although [the
officer’s] conduct . . . might be considered questionable, we do not think that this conduct—even in
the context of an investigation involving a relatively minor misdemeanor charge—can accurately be
characterized as outrageous.”).
123 State v. Burkland, 775 N.W.2d 372, 373 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).
124 Id. at 374.
125 Id. at 376.
120
121
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The Minnesota appellate court found that the officer violated due process
by initiating sexual contact and allowing the contact to escalate, because the
escalation was “unnecessary to any reasonable investigation and offensive
to due process.”126
In summary, the Outrageous Government Conduct defense is recognized
by a number of jurisdictions, both state and federal, but succeeds relatively
rarely. I argue that, in line with the Minnesota appellate court’s opinion in
Burkland, any sexual contact in paid-sex sting operations, performed either by
undercover police officers or confidential informants, should be sufficient for
a defendant to prevail on the defense.
II. PAID-SEX STING OPERATIONS THAT USE SEXUAL CONTACT
BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS
CONSTITUTE OUTRAGEOUS GOVERNMENT CONDUCT
THAT VIOLATES DUE PROCESS
The Supreme Court should hold that sting operations where law
enforcement officers or informants engage in sexual activity to enable
prostitution arrests constitute Outrageous Government Conduct and
therefore are violations of due process. Because of the intimate nature of
sexual conduct, the uniquely vulnerable population targeted by paid-sex sting
operations, and the government’s comparatively minor interest in enacting
these operations, these kinds of paid-sex sting operations clearly “shock the
conscience” and violate the Due Process Clause.
The Court need not reinvent the wheel to hold sexual activity in paid
sting operations violates due process: in fact, the Cuervelo and Nolan-Cooper
tests that govern this question in the Second and Third Circuits clearly show
that sexual activity for paid-sex sting operations is Outrageous Government
Conduct.127 Therefore, the Supreme Court need only adopt these lower-court
tests to ensure no convictions stem from police or informant sexual relations
with investigative targets in prostitution crimes. Alternatively, the Supreme
Court can issue a bright-line rule that it violates the Due Process Clause for
a government agent or informant to engage in sexual contact for the purposes
of securing a prostitution or solicitation conviction.
A. Sexual Contact During Paid-Sex Sting Operations “Shocks the Conscience”
Due process in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantees those
rights that are fundamental, implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and

126
127

Id.
The Cuervelo and Nolan-Cooper tests are set forth in Section II.C, infra.
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deeply rooted in our history and tradition.128 Rochin and its progeny held that
law enforcement conduct to obtain convictions may violate due process on its
own, when the law enforcement action in question “shocks the conscience” or
exceeds the bounds of fundamental fairness.129
Law enforcement engaging in undercover paid sex or encouraging
informants to do so in order to secure a prostitution or prostitution-related
conviction exceeds the bounds of fundamental fairness because of the
degrading nature of the intrusion, the limited ends of securing conviction,
and because the police action is unnecessary to further those limited ends. It
shocks the conscience because it targets vulnerable populations for the
pleasure of police officers, and because the sexual contact subverts any
reasonable basis for seeking paid-sex convictions in the first place.
1. Deceptive Sex Is a Unique Intrusion on Privacy, Bodily Integrity, and
Autonomy Over Intimate Relationships
Twentieth-century Supreme Court jurisprudence makes it abundantly
clear that sex is a uniquely personal and intimate function, and governmental
regulation of it must be scrutinized extremely carefully.130 In the case of paidsex sting operations, the government is not only regulating but directly
engaging in sexual contact in order to charge individuals with the crime of
prostitution.131 This should be scrutinized particularly closely because law
enforcement is intruding on privacy to obtain evidence to be used in a
criminal conviction, which amounts to the greatest possible restriction on
liberty.132

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997).
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571-72 (2003) (noting that our country’s “laws and
traditions in the past half century . . . . show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial
protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to
sex”); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (noting that the decisions
relating to procreation are “the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime”); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 439, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means anything, it
is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S 479, 485 (1965) (holding that regulation of contraceptives violated
the Constitution by intruding on the “sacred precincts of marital bedrooms”).
131 For an argument that sexual contact with sex workers for the purpose of securing
prostitution convictions violates sex workers’ due process right to bodily integrity, see Paula Del
Valle Torres, Comment, Sexual Contact Between A Suspect and Police Officers: How Far Should Police
Go to Prove Prostitution?, 28 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 471, 484-87 (2020).
132 See Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 14 (1956) (noting the Court’s duty is “to see that
the waters of justice are not polluted,” because when they are, “[t]he government of a strong and
free nation does not need [such] convictions”).
128
129
130
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Unlike a typical substantive due process claim, paid sex is currently illegal.
The government may consequently claim that the intrusion is justified by law
enforcement need to ferret out illegal conduct, just like in the case of
confidential informants buying drugs. But intrusions of privacy for the sake
of law enforcement must be scrutinized as carefully as those for other reasons.
In the words of Justice Brandeis,
it is also immaterial that the intrusion was in aid of law enforcement.
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when
the government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally
alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest
dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, wellmeaning but without understanding.133

Sting operations that involve government operatives engaging in crime in
order to prevent and punish crime are suspect from the outset. Even more
ubiquitous sting operations, like buy and bust drug operations, have been
criticized for causing serious third-party harms.134 Such operations may be
undertaken to benefit police departments and government agencies by
increasing conviction numbers even when they do not benefit public safety.135
And it can be difficult to distinguish between sting operations that “reveal the
criminal design” by ferreting out individuals that theoretically would have
committed the crime in question with or without the sting, and those that
target individuals who would not do so but for the operation.136 Courts
emphasize that the purpose of sting operations must be the former: “The
function of the enforcement officials is to investigate, not instigate, crime; to
discover, not to promote, crime.”137 But in reality, distinguishing between the
two kinds of conduct can be impossible, and sting operations may both target
and charge individuals who would not have committed the crime otherwise.138

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928).
See e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh & Thomas W. Joo, Sting Victims: Third-Party Harms in Undercover
Police Operations, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1309, 1311 (2015) (“Law enforcement agencies can structure
undercover operations to control for potential harms, but not all harms can be prevented. Innocent
third parties may be inadvertently victimized. For example, a street “buy and bust” gone wrong
might lead to an exchange of gunfire and an injured innocent bystander.”).
135 Id. at 1337-38.
136 See Bruce Hay, Sting Operations, Undercover Agents, and Entrapment, 70 MO. L. REV. 387,
402-11 (2005) (deriving a mathematical approach to determining how likely the target of a sting
operation would have been to commit the crime in question without law enforcement inducement).
137 Patty v. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 508 P.2d 1121, 1126-27 (Cal. 1973).
138 See, e.g., 486: Valentine’s Day: 21 Chump Street, THIS AM. LIFE, at 25:52 (Feb. 8, 2013),
https://www.thisamericanlife.org/486/valentines-day/act-two-5 [https://perma.cc/MU5F-L2H5]
(telling the story of a boy charged with a felony after procuring marijuana for a girl he had a crush
on, who turned out to be an undercover police officer posing as a student).
133
134
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What’s more, the dangerous power dynamics when law enforcement
intervenes in criminal enterprises can have far-reaching consequences.139
Even accepting the premise that sting operations should be permissible in a
classic drug “buy and bust” scenario, purchasing and engaging in sex is
fundamentally distinct from buying drugs, most importantly because of the
intent of the agent. An agent who receives drugs, unlike a civilian who receives
drugs, has no intention to use those drugs for any personal benefit through use
or sale. There would certainly be a problem with a police officer who engaged in
a drug bust and then sold the drugs or pocketed them for his own use.140
Although possession of a controlled substance is technically a crime,141 and
an officer or confidential informant does possess that substance, it seems
intuitive that the purpose of laws prohibiting possession is based ultimately
in the use or distribution of controlled substances. An agent or confidential
informant who receives drugs theoretically turns them into the police
department immediately. Once again, if they did not do so, they would most
certainly be subject to criminal prosecution. A paid-sex sting operation is
significantly different, because by engaging in sex, agents are committing the
very crime the statute prohibits for their own gain.
2. The Government Has Limited Interest in Using Paid-Sex Sting
Operations to Enable Prostitution Prosecutions
When analyzing Outrageous Government Conduct, particularly in regard
to sting operations, courts should consider the limited government interest
in preventing the crime in question. Although government interest is not an
explicit factor in the Supreme Court majority’s test for Outrageous
Government Conduct, Outrageous Government Conduct is a constitutional
139 See Joh & Joo, supra note 134. Additionally, the Federal Bureau of Investigations has a
history of planting undercover agents to take down organized crime rings, and the results have often
looked more like the FBI promoting mob operations than curtailing them. See Patrick Radden Keefe,
Assets and Liabilities: The Mobster Whitey Bulger Secretly Worked for the F.B.I. Or Was it the Other Way
Around?, NEW YORKER (Sept. 14, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/09/21/assetsand-liabilities/amp [https://perma.cc/J4YC-HDK7] (“[The FBI] disclosed that in the prior year it
had authorized informants to break the law on 5,939 occasions.”).
140 Not that it doesn’t happen. See, e.g., Jeremy Roebuck, Former Philly Officer Sentenced to 9
Years for Selling Drugs Stolen by Corrupt Baltimore Police Squad, PHILA. INQUIRER (Apr. 29, 2019),
https://www.inquirer.com/news/eric-snell-philly-police-corruption-gun-trace-task-force-baltimore20190429.html [https://perma.cc/59DV-7P96] (“A former Philadelphia police officer was sentenced
to nine years in prison Friday for conspiring with officers in Baltimore to sell cocaine and heroin
seized from that city’s streets.”). But police officers and undercover agents who break the law are
hypothetically held to the same standard as ordinary citizens. Contra Heien v. North Carolina, 574
U.S. 54, 67 (2014) (holding that, although an ordinary citizen cannot avoid criminal liability because
they misunderstand the law, police officers can justify investigatory stops based on
misunderstandings of the law).
141 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 844.
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protection, and constitutional protections (particularly the most nebulous
ones) frequently involve analyzing the importance of the government
interest, even when the court is not explicit that it is doing so.142 Justice
Powell, in his Hampton concurrence, hinted that government interest is
important in a due process determination, by arguing that the serious danger
of drug rings warranted more latitude for police undercover operations into
them.143 Additionally, circuit courts have stated that the nature of the crime
and therefore necessity of the sting operation are important factors in an
Outrageous Government Conduct analysis.144
An analysis of the government interests at play clarifies a number of
important factors that weigh against paid-sex sting operations where officers
engage in sexual contact with the target. First, engaging in sexual intercourse
during sting operations is utterly unnecessary to secure a conviction.145
Second, allowing for sexual contact in paid-sex sting operations creates
dangerous incentives in a culture where police sexual violence is already a
tremendous problem.146 And finally, paid-sex sting operations do nothing to
advance protection for the vulnerable victims whose protection is touted as
the reason for criminalizing paid sex in the first place.147
a. Engaging in Sexual Contact Is Unnecessary to Secure a Prostitution Conviction
Courts have considered “the need for the investigative technique that was
used in light of the challenges of investigating and prosecuting the type of
crime being investigated.”148 Sexual contact occurring in paid-sex sting
operations is not needed to limit paid sex.
First, engaging in sexual contact or encouraging engagement in sexual
conduct is absolutely unnecessary to secure a prostitution conviction. The
laws are built for prostitution arrests absent sexual conduct, because typically
142 See Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Paradox of Balancing Significant Interests, 45 HASTINGS L.J.
825, 826 (1993) (“[I]nterests find their way into virtually every theory of constitutional law. The
failure to identify their presence only serves to protect their power.”).
143 Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 495 n.7 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (“One
cannot easily exaggerate the problems confronted by law enforcement authorities in dealing
effectively with an expanding narcotics traffic . . . which is one of the major contributing causes of
escalating crime in our cities. . . . Enforcement officials therefore must be allowed flexibility
adequate to counter effectively such criminal activity.”).
144 See, e.g., United States v. Black, 733 F.3d 294, 303 (9th Cir. 2013) (listing factors in
Outrageous Government Conduct analysis, including “the nature of the crime being pursued and
necessity for the actions taken in light of the nature of the criminal enterprise at issue”); United
States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 378 n.6 (3d Cir. 1978) (“[T]he court must consider the nature of the
crime and the tools available to law enforcement agencies to combat it.”).
145 See infra sub-subsection II.A.2.a.
146 See infra sub-subsection II.A.2.b.
147 See infra sub-subsection II.A.2.c.
148 Black, 733 F.3d at 309.
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prostitution and its parallel offense, solicitation, allow officers to charge
individuals either when they are engaging in paid sexual intercourse or
offering to do so.149 There is no argument for committing an undisputed
crime at the expense of an investigation’s target when the same conviction can
be secured without it. “If the police are going to arrest a suspected prostitute,
go ahead and make the arrest—but do not sport with her.”150
Second, if the law enforcement goal is strictly reduction of the sale of sex,
the police can instead engage in no-contact sting operations targeting men
who are buying sex instead of people who are selling it. Studies have shown
that arresting so-called “Johns” instead of sex workers was significantly more
effective in reducing sex sales.151 This approach is less likely to target lowincome women of color, and trans and gender-nonconforming people of color,
which paid-sex sting operations and policing in general does.152
b. Agents or Informants Who Engage in Sexual Contact for Purposes of Paid-Sex
Stings Have Inappropriate and Dangerous Incentives
Paid-sex sting operations enable a power dynamic conducive to law
enforcement abuse. In Commonwealth v. Sun Cha Chon, the informant intended
149 See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-14 (West 2012) (defining Prostitution in Illinois
law as “knowingly perform[ing], offer[ing] or agree[ing] to perform any act of sexual penetration”);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 851(1) (West 2019) (“‘Prostitution’ means engaging in, or agreeing
to engage in, or offering to engage in a sexual act or sexual contact.”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.00
(Consol. 2020) (“A person is guilty of Prostitution when such person engages or agrees or offers to
engage in sexual conduct with another person in return for a fee.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-203(5)
(2019) (defining prostitution under North Carolina law as “[t]he performance of, offer of, or
agreement to perform” sexual acts for payment); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §43.02(a) (West 2019)
(describing prostitution as “knowingly offer[ing] or agree[ing to receive a fee from another to engage
in sexual conduct”); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.88.030 (2020) (defining prostitution as “engag[ing]
or agree[ing] or offer[ing] to engage in sexual conduct with another person in return for a fee”).
When the statute is not explicit that agreement to perform prostitution is sufficient for conviction,
state courts most often have found it to be so. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Potts, 460 A.2d 1127, 1135
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (holding that even though the Pennsylvania statute defining Prostitution is
not explicit, Prostitution clearly “encompasses an agreement to perform” sexual acts for hire). For
further discussion of the variation among state Prostitution laws, see Prostitution and Sex Workers, 8
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 355, 356-60 (2007).
150 State v. Thoreson, No. A06–454, 2007 WL 1053205, at *11 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2007).
151 See MICHAEL SHIVELY, KRISTINA KLIORYS, KRISTIN WHEELER & DANA HUNT, A
NATIONAL OVERVIEW OF PROSTITUTION AND SEX TRAFFICKING DEMAND REDUCTION
EFFORTS, FINAL REPORT, at iv (2012), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/238796.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N58P-AUN2] (“When compared to evidence of the effectiveness of interventions
addressing supply and distribution in curtailing commercial sex markets, evidence supporting the
impact of demand-reduction initiatives is relatively strong.”).
152 ERIN FITZGERALD, SARAH ELSPETH, DARBY HICKEY WITH CHERNO BIKO & HARPER
JEAN TOBIN, MEANINGFUL WORK: TRANSGENDER EXPERIENCES IN THE SEX TRADE 5 (2015),
https://www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/Meaningful%20Work-Full%20Report_FINAL_3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UBR2-QR2B].
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to pay for sex even prior to agreeing to participate in the sting operation.153 And
even if officers or confidential informants do not set out to pay for sex, when
they do anyway, they are fundamentally benefiting from sexual pleasure in the
interaction. In cases like Chon, undercover agents benefit twice: they engage in
sexual activity, and they receive payment. But even without overt payment,
police and agents who stand to gain at the expense of investigation targets should
be included in Outrageous Government Conduct when it is fundamentally
unnecessary for the investigation, because it creates dangerous incentives.
In addition to the sexual benefit, the power dynamic between officers and
investigative targets in a sexual transaction is inappropriate and dangerous. It is
all too easy to imagine the abuses of power that could (and do) occur: officers
have the incentive to selectively target women they want to have sexual
intercourse with and to extort or force sex.154 State-sanctioned sexual activity
between police and those who are targets of their investigation—particularly
those who are women, people of color, and LGBTQ+—is a recipe for statesanctioned egregious misconduct.155 It is also worth noting that when officers
engage in undercover sting operations intended to target “Johns” rather than sex
workers, incidents involving sexual contact are “extremely rare,”156 suggesting
that sexual contact is more related to officer preference than necessity.157

Commonwealth v. Sun Cha Chon, 983 A.2d 784, 785 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009).
See Sirin Kale, Police Are Allegedly Sleeping with Sex Workers Before Arresting Them, VICE
(May 3, 2017, 8:30 AM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/59mbkx/police-are-allegely-sleeping-withsex-workers-before-arresting-them [https://perma.cc/X38X-NH7K] (“Former LAPD officer and sex
worker activist Norma Jean Almodovar says that many undercover vice cops engaging in prostitution
busts have less than honorable intentions. ‘It’s a game to them . . . . They get to screw us for free,
and cops love freebies. Think how much they love donuts.’”).
155 See RACHEL SWANER, MELISSA LABRIOLA, MICHAEL REMPEL, ALLYSON WALKER &
JOSEPH SPADAFORE, YOUTH INVOLVEMENT IN THE SEX TRADE: A NATIONAL STUDY 61 (2016),
https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/documents/Youth%20Involvement%20in%20the
%20Sex%20Trade_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/33BD-VVYK] (finding that in 2009, around 80% of
nationwide arrestees for prostitution were women, and 55% of arrests of under-18-year-olds, and 43%
of arrests between 18 and 24-year-olds, were black); id. at xi (“Trans females (37%) were significantly
more likely than cis males (12%) or cis females (17%) to report a prior prostitution arrest and at least
three times more likely to report a prostitution arrest in the past year (30% v. 9% v. 10%).”); David
E. Kanouse, Sandra H. Berry & Naihua Duan, Drawing a Probability Sample of Female Street Prostitutes
in Los Angeles County, 37 J. SEX RSCH. 45, 49 (1999) (finding only 17% of sex worker respondents in
a probability sample of female sex workers were white).
156 GARY T. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 17 (1988).
157 See Phillip Walters, Would a Cop Do This: Ending the Practice of Sexual Sampling in Prostitution
Stings, 29 LAW & INEQ. 451, 472 (2011) (arguing that “the discrepancy in how stings involving female
undercover officers and same-sex encounters are handled” may be attributable to the homophobic
hypermasculine police culture and to the fact that “officers do not want to engage in sexual activity
with suspected johns”).
153
154
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These scenarios are not hypothetical: even outside of paid-sex sting
operations, law enforcement sexual assault is already far too common.158
When the Department of Justice investigated the Baltimore Police
Department, one report found that sexual misconduct was the second most
common form of reported police misconduct.159 In 2016, the Department of
Justice reported that multiple Baltimore officers targeted people involved in
the sex trade “to coerce sexual favors . . . in exchange for avoiding arrest, or
for cash or narcotics.”160 Officers in numerous other states have also been
convicted of extorting sex from women in exchange for dropping charges,
often specifically targeting women of color and sex workers.161 In addition,
officers who are charged with sexual violence have disturbingly high rates of
recidivism.162 The well-documented “cult of masculinity” in policing that
encourages and enables law enforcement sexual violence suggests that this
behavior will continue.163 And even apart from police culture or individual
officer motivations, police work is inherently rife with opportunities for
police sexual violence: from the vulnerability of the citizens they engage with,
158 See id. (quoting an expert who explained that “[t]he reality of some police having sex with
sex workers during the course of undercover operations has been in existence as long as selling sex
has been a criminal offense”).
159 THE CATO INST., NATIONAL POLICE MISCONDUCT REPORTING PROJECT: 2010
ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2010), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/77th2013/Exhibits/Assembly/JUD/
AJUD338L.pdf [https://perma.cc/U55B-TS6R].
160 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
149 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/883296/download [https://perma.cc/96PP-98SA].
161 See, e.g., Sean Murphy, Ex-Oklahoma Officer Gets 263 Years for Rapes, Sex Assaults, ASSOC.
PRESS (Jan. 21, 2016), https://apnews.com/f4e0610c2f604c2c95efd8d5f244e08e/ex-oklahoma-officerbe-sentenced-rape-sex-crimes [https://perma.cc/F575-8MTC] (telling the story of a police officer
who raped and sexually victimized Black women who he suspected of being addicted to drugs or
working in the sex trade); Matt Hamilton, Two LAPD Officers Plead No Contest to Sexually Assaulting
Women While on Duty, Receive 25-Year Prison Terms, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2018, 4:55 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-lapd-officers-rape-plea-20180226-story.html
[https://perma.cc/FUJ4-P3S3] (describing how two LAPD officers pled no contest to allegations of
extorting sex from women arrested or serving as informants related to drug crime); Kelly Mena,
Ex-Cops Once Accused of Rape Sentenced to 5 Years Probation, BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE (Oct. 10,
2019), https://brooklyneagle.com/articles/2019/10/10/ex-cops-once-accused-of-rape-sentenced-to-5years-probation [https://perma.cc/TUS8-RLFR] (describing how two Brooklyn police officers
were sentenced to five years’ probation after they had sex with a 19-year-old in custody for
marijuana possession).
162 See Cara E. Rabe-Hemp & Jeremy Braithwaite, An Exploration of Recidivism and the Officer
Shuffle in Police Sexual Violence, 16 POLICE Q. 127 (2012) (finding that 41% of police sexual violence
cases were committed by officers who had prior accusations of sexual violence, and that those
recidivist officers had on average four victims each).
163 See Peter B. Kraska & Victor E. Kappeler, To Serve and Pursue: Exploring Police Sexual
Violence Against Women, 12 JUST. Q. 85, 91 (1995) (discussing research into sexism in police culture
and comparing law enforcement to other male-dominated organizations); Walters, supra note 157
(“[T]he tendency for sexual conduct to occur in prostitution stings involving interactions between
male officers and women engaged in prostitution may be better understood as an issue of power and
gender rather than one of law enforcement necessity.”).
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to the coercive power of an officer’s ability to arrest and charge, to the lack of
immediate on-the-job oversight.164 Giving officers the power to engage in
sexual contact in paid-sex sting operations only serves as state-sanctioned
police sexual violence, and creates an environment where it is even more
difficult for victims of law enforcement rape and sexual misconduct to seek a
remedy. The government’s interest should be in eliminating law enforcement
sexual violence, rather than creating situations in which it can thrive.
c. Paid-Sex Sting Operations are Unsupported by Predominant Arguments for
Criminalization of Paid Sex
Paid-sex sting operations do not further the goals that supposedly justified
criminalizing paid sex in the first place. When laws criminalizing paid sex
were initially passed over a century ago, they were based in religious views of
“morality”165 and utilized morality-centric language. Over time the language
of social morality was removed,166 but instead pro-criminalization arguments
today focus entirely on the need to protect vulnerable women in the sex
trade.167 Rather than attacking sex sellers, the movement against
164 Philip M. Stinson Sr., John Liederbach, Steven L. Brewer Jr. & Brooke E. Mathna, Police Sexual
Misconduct: A National Scale Study of Arrested Officers, 26 CRIM. JUST. POL. REV. 665, 665-66 (2015).
165 See Prostitution and Sex Workers, 8 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 355, 355-56 (noting that morality
concerns among religious groups and women’s societies in the late nineteenth century contributed
to some states regulating and eventually banning prostitution).
166 For example, the stated purpose of the 1910 White Slave Traffic Act, more commonly known
as the Mann Act, was to combat forced prostitution, but it was utilized (and upheld by the Supreme
Court) to prosecute all measures of immoral sexual behavior, even consensual sex. See Eric Weiner,
The Long, Colorful History of the Mann Act, NPR (Mar. 11, 2008, 2:00 PM),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=88104308
[https://perma.cc/UCM8W82F]; Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485-86 (1917) (stating that the Mann Act prohibits
the transportation of women through interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in immoral
practices and implying that consensual sex qualifies as such a practice); Ariela R. Dubler, Immoral
Purposes: Marriage and the Genus of Illicit Sex, 115 YALE L.J. 756, 793 (2006) (explaining how Caminetti
found that the language of the Mann Act “clearly included this broader swath of immoral sexual
behavior”). The Act resulted from widespread “moral panic” around the imaginary crisis of white
slavery, which was based on “sensationalized stories of innocent girls kidnapped off the streets by
foreigners, drugged, smuggled across the country and forced to work in brothels.” Weiner, supra.
Initially the Mann Act was explicit in its moral underpinnings, making it illegal to transport women
interstate “for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose.” 36 Stat.
85, 825 (1910) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2421). In 1986, Congress amended the Mann Act to eliminate
the language of “debauchery” and “immoral purpose,” so that instead the law forbade interstate
transport with intent to engage in “prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can
be charged with a criminal offense.” Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-628, § 5(b), 100 Stat. 3511 (1986).
167 See, e.g., Janice G. Raymond, Ten Reasons for Not Legalizing Prostitution and a Legal Response
to the Demand for Prostitution, 2 J. TRAUMA PRAC. 315, 316 (2008) (giving ten reasons why legalization
“makes the harm of prostitution to women invisible, expands the sex industry, and does not empower
the women in prostitution”); Timothy Williams, In Washington, a Fight to Decriminalize Prostitution
Divides Allies, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/17/us/washington-
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decriminalization points to incidents of sex trafficking and violence,168 and
equivocates paid sex with rape or sexual assault because of the power dynamic
between seller and purchaser.169 This language comes from politicians,
authors, activists, and opponents to decriminalization on both the political
left and the right.170
With this rationale for maintaining laws criminalizing paid sex, both
advocates and opponents of decriminalization should condemn paid-sex sting
operations that involve sexual contact. For law enforcement to engage in sex
in order to secure criminal convictions inflicts the very social ill that advocates
for criminalization claim to oppose. The debate around prostitution laws is

legal-prostitution.html [https://perma.cc/L8CN-M9R8] (reporting that opponents of D.C.’s bill to
decriminalize sex work argued that the bill “will cause more harm and more exploitation of our most
marginalized people”); Marissa J. Lang, D.C. Effort to Decriminalize Sex Work Won’t Move Forward
After 14-Hour Hearing, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2019, 5:40 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/dc-politics/dc-effort-to-decriminalize-sex-work-wont-move-forward-after-tense-14-hourhearing/2019/11/16/b7c77358-06ef-11ea-ac12-3325d49eacaa_story.html
[https://perma.cc/68TKVUSD] (quoting one opponent of D.C.’s bill saying “[t]o separate prostitution from human
trafficking is impossible . . . . If you pass this law . . . you will all have blood on your hands”).
168 See, e.g., Letter from Magdy Abdel-Hamid, Egyptian Association for Community Participation
Enhancement, et al. to Salil Shetty, Sec. Gen., Amnesty Int’l & Seven W. Hawkins, Exec. Dir., Amnesty
Int’l, Statement on Amnesty International’s Resolution to Decriminalize Pimps, Brothel Owners and
Buyers of Sex (July 11, 2015), https://catwinternational.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/AI-OpenLetter-over-600-sigs.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NT5-S6ZD] (arguing that the decriminalization of sex
work increases sex trafficking and violence against women).
169 See generally Evelina Giobbe, Prostitution: Buying the Right to Rape, in RAPE AND SEXUAL
ASSAULT III 143, 144 (1991) (Ann Wolbert Burgess ed., 1991) (arguing that regardless of a sex
worker’s degree of control, paid sex is sexual abuse).
170 Progressive and feminist thinkers like Andrea Dworkin and Catharine McKinnon oppose
paid sex as the ultimate tool of oppression of women. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Prostitution and
Civil Rights, 1 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 13, 13 (1993) (“Women are prostituted precisely in order to be
degraded and subjected to cruel and brutal treatment without human limits . . . .”); Andrea
Dworkin, Pornography and the New Puritans, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 1992), https://archive.nytimes.com/
www.nytimes.com/books/97/06/15/lifetimes/25885.html [https://perma.cc/ZU6F-WT9Z] (using
the imagery of a “woman lynched naked on a tree, or restrained with ropes and a ball gag in her
mouth” to describe Dworkin’s view of the confines of prostitution). Since the early 1900s Republican
lawmakers have relied on narratives of vulnerable women forced into sex slavery to pass legislation
that ultimately served only to arrest and charge those women themselves. See Hallie Lieberman,
Why Laws to Fight Sex Trafficking Often Backfire, WASH. POST (Mar. 4, 2019, 6:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/03/04/why-laws-fight-sex-trafficking-often-backfire
[https://perma.cc/4ZTE-S58P] (noting that the Mann Act was passed in 1910 to “protect women
from being forced into prostitution,” but in the first four years 71% of the convictions it brought
were of sex workers). A modern law, the Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA) of 2017, has
been analogized to the Mann Act because advocates on both sides of the political aisle argued that
it would protect vulnerable women; once passed, it has been criticized for “directly endanger[ing]
individuals who perform commercial sexual services.” Lura Chamberlain, FOSTA: A Hostile Law
With a Human Cost, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2171, 2203-04 (2019); see also Lieberman, supra, at 3
(arguing that “FOSTA’s development has been eerily similar to the Mann Act’s” because both are
based in racism and carry a tremendous cost to the purported victims they claim to protect).
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intensely divisive and does not fall along traditional party lines.171 But given
the widespread agreement on both sides that policy and legislation
surrounding paid sex should focus on supporting and protecting those on the
selling side, no advocate of decriminalization or criminalization should
support the police tactics at issue in this piece.172
3. State Court Decisions Denying Defendants’ Outrageous Government
Conduct Claims in Transactional Sex Sting Operations Must be
Reexamined in Light of Changing Societal Circumstances
The “shocks the conscience” test—and substantive due process as a
concept—depends on the collective conscience and the normative views of
society at the time. Therefore, what shocks the conscience “is bound to fall
differently at different times” as it evolves.173 Consequently, change in societal
views may necessitate revisiting the application of the Due Process Clause.
Opponents of an Outrageous Government Conduct defense in paid-sex
sting operations have plenty of state court decisions to bolster their
arguments.174 Most of these decisions are at least thirty years old, however, and
are noticeably antiquated in their arguments and holdings. For example, State v.
Emerson is a case out of Washington State in which the court held that a paidsex sting operation involving sexual intercourse did not violate the Due Process
Clause.175 The defendant in Emerson was convicted under a law that forbade
acting as a “common prostitute.”176 The law defined “common prostitute” as “a
woman who offered her body for indiscriminate sexual intercourse with more
than one man,” regardless of whether she received payment.177 To determine
whether a woman was a “common prostitute” by law, juries were to “consider [a
woman’s] general conduct and all other circumstances . . . tending to show
171 See generally Lara Gerassi, A Heated Debate: Theoretical Perspectives of Sexual Exploitation and
Sex Work, 42 J. SOC. & SOCIO. WELFARE 79 (2015) (reviewing the multitude of philosophical, legal,
and political perspectives prostitution laws are analyzed with); Jody Freeman, The Feminist Debate
Over Prostitution Reform: Prostitutes’ Rights Groups, Radical Feminists, and the (Im)possibility of Consent,
5 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 75, 75 (1989) (describing the varying theoretical and ideological bases
that cause divergent views of prostitution).
172 Although this argument assumes that criminalization advocates make victimization
arguments in good faith, it does not require it. Insidious motivations such as racism, homophobia,
and transphobia certainly underlie a great deal of the sex work debate, but this animus cannot justify
a government interest in maintaining paid-sex sting operations, implicitly or explicitly.
173 See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170-71 (1952) (“To believe that this judicial exercise
of judgment could be avoided by freezing ‘due process of law’ at some fixed stage of time or thought
is to suggest that the most important aspect of constitutional adjudication is a function for inanimate
machines and not for judges . . . .”).
174 See supra note 122.
175 Id.
176 State v. Emerson, 517 P.2d 245, 245 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973).
177 State v. Zuanich, 593 P.2d 1314, 1321 (Wash. 1979) (Stafford, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
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whether or not she so holds herself out to the public.”178 The court in Emerson
cited to a prior ruling that expanded further, saying: “[i]f a woman by words or
acts or by any device invites and solicits and submits to indiscriminate
intercourse, she is a common prostitute.”179
Importantly, many of the laws, like those in Emerson, that dictated those
antiquated and blatantly sexist views have changed, as has enforcement of those
laws.180 State courts in the 1960s and 1970s were operating in a world with a very
different set of moral, legal, and ethical assumptions than state court judges are
today.181 And even while mired in those antiquated attitudes, more often than
not these courts still did not approve of police engaging in sex during sting
operations, even while saying these actions were technically constitutional.182
Because of the drastic changes in societal views on paid sex and police
tactics, these state court decisions need not inform our views today about
what constitutes Outrageous Government Conduct. Instead, more recent
court decisions like Chon and Burkland should be foregrounded. I do not argue
that we should pick and choose state court decisions based on whether or not
they come out in favor of the Outrageous Government Conduct defense:
rather, that we should follow the Supreme Court’s exact prescriptions about
how to apply the Due Process Clause.
In Rochin, Justice Frankfurter called the Due Process Clause “the least
specific and most comprehensive protection of liberties.”183 Unlike other fixed
constitutional protections, the Due Process Clause requires judges to make
decisions that are based on “interests of society,” that are not “final and fixed,”
and that are “bound to fall differently at different times.”184 Essentially, the
Due Process Clause allows for flexibility over time—and what’s more, it may
actually require it.185 Chon and Burkland represent court decisions made in the
Emerson, 517 P.2d at 247 (citing State v. Thuna, 59 Wash. 689, 690 (Wash. 1910)).
Thuna, 109 P. at 331.
The law defining and criminalizing acting as a “common prostitute” has been repealed.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.060 (1973). Washington’s new Prostitution laws instead criminalize only
“engag[ing] or agree[ing] or offer[ing] to engage in sexual conduct with another person in return for
a fee.” WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.88.030 (2020).
181 See infra notes 185–88; see also Catherine I. Bolzendahl & Daniel J. Myers, Feminist Attitudes
and Support for Gender Equality: Opinion Change in Women and Men, 1974-1998, 83 SOC. FORCES 759,
759-89 (2004).
182 See, e.g., State v. Tookes, 699 P.2d 983, 987 (Haw. 1985) (noting that despite the
constitutionality of police engaging in sex during a Prostitution sting operation, “we question
whether the actions of . . . the police in this case comport with the ethical standards which law
enforcement officials should be guided by”); Emerson, 517 P.2d at 249 (“[O]ur opinion should not be
misconstrued as a moral endorsement of the means employed to obtain the evidence used . . . .”).
183 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170 (1952).
184 Id. at 170-71.
185 See generally, Lawrence Rosenthal, Does Due Process Have an Original Meaning? On Originalism,
Due Process, Procedural Innovation . . . and Parking Tickets, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2007) (arguing that the
178
179
180
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twenty-first century, in light of society’s evolving normative standards in
regard to due process. The drastic changes in attitudes towards
criminalization and responses to the sex trade merit reexamining the question
of Outrageous Government Conduct.
These changing attitudes have already taken root in policy changes. In
Washington State, for example, although prostitution remains a crime,186 the
Seattle police department has stopped arresting people suspected of sex sales
and instead drives them to counseling.187 Powerful organizations like
Amnesty International have supported completely decriminalizing paid sex,
as have high-profile political candidates and the current Vice President.188
Recent polls show that a majority of Americans favor decriminalization, and
that support is highest among voters between the ages of eighteen and fortyfour, across all political identifications, suggesting that “[a]ge may be an even
stronger predictor of support for decriminalizing sex work than political
party.”189 This data shows that attitudes about paid sex have changed
significantly since the 1960s and 1970s. The courts’ definition of due process
can and must change along with it. Even without decriminalization, the mere
fact that a majority of Americans do not support arrest or conviction for the

Due Process Clause cannot be viewed with an originalist interpretation and must therefore be viewed as
a delegation of authority to courts to define and apply “due process” as a concept).
186 Prostitution is a misdemeanor under Washington law, which carries a potential penalty of
ninety days in jail and a fine of $1,000. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.20.010 (2020) (“Any crime
punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in a county jail for
not more than ninety days, or by both such fine and imprisonment is a misdemeanor.”); id.
§ 9A.88.030 (“Prostitution is a misdemeanor.”).
187 See David Kroman, Seattle’s Latest Prostitution Sting: Progressive or Misguided? CROSSCUT
(Nov. 1, 2018), https://crosscut.com/2018/11/seattles-latest-Prostitution-sting-progressive-ormisguided [https://perma.cc/V4KN-7CKM] (citing this approach as consistent with Seattle’s
broader goal of “stamp[ing] out prostitution without penalizing the sex workers in the trade”).
188 See AMNESTY INT’L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL POLICY ON STATE OBLIGATIONS TO
RESPECT, PROTECT AND FULFIL THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF SEX WORKERS 2 (2016),
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/POL3040622016ENGLISH.PDF
[https://perma.cc/8ERU-FVPB] (“Amnesty International calls for the decriminalization of all
aspects of adult consensual sex work due to the foreseeable barriers that criminalization creates to
the realization of the human rights of sex workers.”); Jasmine Garsd, Should Sex Work Be
Decriminalized? Some Activists Say It’s Time, NPR (Mar. 22, 2019, 2:43 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/03/22/705354179/should-sex-work-be-decriminalized-some-activists-sayits-time [https://perma.cc/FG37-MTRA] (explaining that many organizations are “advocating bills
to decriminalize sex work in New York City and New York state”); Tessa Stuart, Kamala Harris
Declares Her Support for Decriminalizing Sex Work, ROLLING STONE (Feb. 26, 2019, 3:34 PM),
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/kamala-harris-sex-workers-rights-799021
[https://perma.cc/P4HE-UMP4] (describing then-Senator Kamala Harris’s support for the
decriminalization of sex work between consenting adults).
189 NINA LUO, DECRIMINALIZING SURVIVAL: POLICY PLATFORM AND POLLING ON THE
DECRIMINALIZATION OF SEX WORK 22-23 (2020), http://filesforprogress.org/memos/
decriminalizing-sex-work.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XYF-ETKV].

570

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 539

crime of prostitution fatally undermines police justifications for elaborate
sting operations to target paid sex.
B. Entrapment Is an Inadequate Substitute for the Outrageous Government
Conduct Defense
The defense of subjective entrapment as it currently stands is no
substitute for the Outrageous Government Conduct defense in paid-sex sting
operations because, in the majority of jurisdictions, a finding of
predisposition defeats any entrapment claim.190 Therefore, when an
individual is targeted by law enforcement, evidence of predisposition can
render an entrapment defense impossible no matter the egregiousness of officer
misconduct.191 Some have called Outrageous Government Conduct cases
“extreme entrapment” because both involve police conduct that goes
overboard.192 But entrapment’s predisposition element undermines one of the
defense’s purported goals: deterring outrageous conduct.193 The entrapment
defense seems, in part, based on the idea that inducing someone to commit a
crime is itself wrong. But predisposition muddies this idea by focusing the
defense on the actions and prior record of the criminal defendant, rather than
the law enforcement officer.194 If Outrageous Government Conduct as a
defense was, in fact, an outgrowth of entrapment, the same problem might
occur. But unlike entrapment, Outrageous Government Conduct is a test
based in the Bill of Rights, and a question of due process must focus on the
behavior of government agents.195 Even in a case where a defendant was
undoubtedly predisposed, the Constitution cannot allow courts to turn their
190 See e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973) (“Respondent’s
concession . . . that the jury finding as to predisposition was supported by the evidence is, therefore,
fatal to his claim of entrapment.”).
191 For further discussion about the distinctions between entrapment and Outrageous
Government Conduct, see Eve A. Zelinger, The Outrageous Government Conduct Defense: An
Interpretive Argument for Its Application by SCOTUS, 46 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 153, 160-62 (2018).
192 Rachael Urbansky, Note, Seducing the Target: Sexual Intercourse as Outrageous Government
Conduct, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 729, 734 (2000).
193 See T. Ward Frampton, Predisposition and Positivism: The Forgotten Foundations of the
Entrapment Doctrine, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 111, 113 (2013) (noting that under
predisposition, “[f]actors like the nature or size of the inducement, the complexity of the
government artifice, or the independent capacity of the defendant to commit the crime are largely
irrelevant . . . rather, the controlling question is whether the defendant is a person otherwise
innocent . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
194 See Andrew Carlon, Note, Entrapment, Punishment, and the Sadistic State, 93 VA. L. REV.
1081, 1088 (2007) (describing how the entrapment test allows the court to explore “the defendant’s
character, prior bad acts, and other otherwise traditionally irrelevant and prejudicial evidence”).
195 See Michael O. Zabriskie, If the Postman Always “Stings” Twice, Who Is the Next Target?—An
Examination of the Entrapment Theory, 19 J. CONTEMP. L. 217, 225-27 (1993) (describing that the
conduct of law enforcement agents can be evaluated under a due process analysis).
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backs on egregious police misconduct. The Rochin court did not mention
Antonio Rochin’s undeniably illegal actions, or the potential danger of the
crime.196 Instead, it faced horrific law enforcement overreach and said: this
shall not stand.197 Subjective entrapment in its current form cannot do that,
which makes it an inadequate substitute for an Outrageous Government
Conduct defense in paid-sex sting operations.
Objective-approach entrapment could theoretically solve this problem by
presenting an entrapment defense without a predisposition requirement. But
because entrapment has no basis in the Constitution, it cannot protect
individuals in subjective-approach jurisdictions from outrageous government
action without a due process defense. As a federal constitutional defense
recognized by the Supreme Court, Outrageous Government Conduct would
protect all defendants who are targeted by outrageous misconduct by
government agents. Defendants who are not able to put forward an
entrapment claim could still successfully argue their due process rights were
violated by Outrageous Government Conduct.198
C. The Cuervelo and Nolan–Cooper Tests Currently in Effect Clearly Prohibit
Sexual Contact by Law Enforcement for the Purposes
of Inducing a Crime of Prostitution
Some commentators have advocated for a bright-line rule that a government
agent engaging in sex with the target of an investigation is Outrageous
Government Conduct.199 However, courts across the country have rejected this
view, finding that there are instances when a government agent or informant
engages in sexual relations with a target that do not violate the target’s due
process rights.200 Those cases focus primarily on a different kind of sexual
inducement, best illustrated by the case of United States v. Cuervelo.201
196 See generally Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (focusing discussion on law
enforcement conduct rather than on the defendant’s conduct).
197 See id. at 172 (“[W]e are compelled to conclude that the proceedings by which this conviction
was obtained do more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about
combatting crime too energetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience.”).
198 United States v. Cuervelo, 949 F.2d 559, 565 (2d Cir. 1991).
199 See Urbansky, supra note 192, at 732 (calling for “a new rule that any sexual relationship
between a government agent and the target of an investigation which advances to the point of sexual
intercourse is a per se violation of the target’s due process rights”).
200 See, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462, 1466 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[T]he deceptive creation
and/or exploitation of an intimate relationship does not exceed the boundary of permissible law
enforcement tactics.”); United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 245 (3d Cir. 1998) (concluding that
a one-time sexual intercourse between a government agent and the defendant was not a violation of due
process); United States v. Miller, 891 F.2d 1265, 1268 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding that a sexually intimate
relationship between a government informant and the target of a drug investigation did not constitute
truly Outrageous Government Conduct).
201 For an in-depth discussion of the Cuervelo case and test, see supra Section II.C.
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Under the Cuervelo test, sexual contact in a paid-sex sting operation
clearly violates the Due Process Clause. In fact, any case where law
enforcement engages in sexual relations—or induces a confidential informant
to engage in sexual relations—for the purpose of securing a prostitution
conviction fits squarely in the realm of illegal conduct under Cuervelo.
The first requirement of Cuervelo is “that the government consciously set
out to use sex as a weapon in its investigatory arsenal or acquiesced in such
conduct for its own purposes upon learning that such a relationship existed.”202
When the government engages in sexual relations with an investigative target
and the end goal is to secure a charge of prostitution, there is no doubt that the
sex is being used as a weapon to achieve that goal. The only potential leeway
here is Cuervelo’s language that government agents “acquiesced in such conduct
for its own purposes upon learning that such a relationship existed”;203 in a
hypothetical case involving a confidential informant, perhaps the government
could claim not to know the encounter crossed into a sexual relationship. But
under Nolan–Cooper, the Third Circuit adapts this test to include any conduct
the government knew or should have known was occurring.204 This adaptation
closes the loophole somewhat, essentially requiring that the police brief
confidential informants that they are not permitted to engage in sexual conduct
and take steps to ensure that this will not occur. And in cases like Chon, where
police instructed the informant to “go ahead and have sex,” there is no doubt
that the first prong is met.205
The second prong, that the government agent initiated a sexual
relationship, or allowed it to continue to exist, to achieve governmental ends,
is also clearly met.206 When government agents engage in a sexual
relationship to obtain a conviction, they achieve the government ends of law
enforcement and securing convictions for illegal acts. When they permit a
confidential informant to do so, the same conclusion proceeds.
The final prong of Cuervelo is that the sexual relationship took place
during or close to the period covered by the indictment and was entwined
with the events charged therein.207 This is perhaps the clearest of all. When
the indictment itself charges sexual conduct, the sexual conduct charged is
without a doubt covered by the indictment.
Under the Cuervelo and Nolan–Cooper tests, the government action in Chon
is outrageous. And although both the trial and appellate courts cited some of the
more egregious, horrifying facts from the case—for example, that the police
202
203
204
205
206
207

Cuervelo, 949 F.2d at 567.
Id.
Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 233.
Commonwealth v. Sun Cha Chon, 983 A.2d 784, 790 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009).
Cuervelo, 949 F.2d at 567.
Id.
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officers laughed and joked with the informant about the sex, and that the
informant claimed to be “offended” by the acts and then happily went through
with them anyway208—the test clearly prohibits any case of police or undercover
informants engaging in sexual contact for the purpose of charging prostitution.
D. The Supreme Court Should Either Issue a Bright-Line Rule that This Conduct
Is Outrageous or Adopt the Cuervelo/Nolan–Cooper
Limits that Ensure it Will Be
As it stands now, numerous jurisdictions have no bar on police engaging
in sexual acts or inducing informants to do so for the purpose of obtaining
prostitution charges. If entrapment is unavailable because of predisposition,
and the jurisdiction either does not recognize an Outrageous Government
Conduct claim or has a prohibitively high bar to doing so, vulnerable people
who will be targeted by these actions are placed at risk of conviction and due
process violations based on egregious law enforcement tactics.
Courts have options to make clear that this conduct is unacceptable and
protect the public from convictions based on outrageous government
conduct. First, they can issue a bright-line rule: when a government agent or
informant has sexual contact for the purposes of securing a prostitution or
solicitation conviction, that is the outrageous government action
contemplated by Hampton and Sherman. Second, they can adopt the test laid
out in Cuervelo and Nolan-Cooper to define the scope of permissible sexual
conduct between government agents and investigative targets. Finally, they
can put forth any new definition of Outrageous Government Conduct that
ensures law enforcement is prohibited from engaging in paid sex to secure a
prostitution or prostitution-related conviction.
III. WITHOUT THE DEFENSE, WHAT ARE OUR OPTIONS?
Without Supreme Court guidance, advocates in states can push for local
legislation that will criminalize this action. For example, in jurisdictions that
currently operate without an Outrageous Government Conduct defense, or
where it is prohibitively difficult to prove, local lawmakers and organizers
have worked to supplement or replace it.209
One option is criminalizing specific law enforcement activity, so that even
if criminal defendants are unable to invoke the Outrageous Government
Conduct defense, police can be prosecuted. It is worth noting that these
solutions can work in tandem: even in a jurisdiction where the Outrageous
Government Conduct defense is accessible, it could still be valuable to have
208
209

Chon, 983 A.2d at 790.
See infra notes 210–212.
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an option to prosecute law enforcement. However, even with prosecution of
police officers, targets of investigation could potentially still be prosecuted
and face jail time, even if the officer goes on to be charged as well.
In Pennsylvania, for example, there is currently no criminal ban on law
enforcement officers having sexual contact with a person in their custody, and
an officer accused of sexual assault can claim consent as a full legal defense.210
Legislation has been introduced in both Pennsylvania legislative houses to
criminalize all sexual contact between an officer and an individual in
custody.211 The legislation, entitled “No Consent in Custody,” was introduced
in the Pennsylvania Senate by Senator Katie Muth, who argued that because
of the power imbalance between an officer and the person in their custody,
“there cannot be consent when you are in the custody of law enforcement.”212
Notably, however, the proposed legislation and its successful counterparts
in other states would not protect a target of a paid-sex sting operation, who
would not be in the custody of police when the sexual act occurred. Shea
Rhodes, a Pennsylvania attorney, and advocate for victims of commercial
sexual exploitation, advocates instead for a more comprehensive statute
entitled “sexual assault by peace officer” that would apply not only to people
in custody, but to anyone being investigated by the peace officer at the time.213
Under a statute of this kind, the state would be able to prosecute an officer
who engaged in sexual acts with a person who was the target of a prostitution
investigation. However, it is unclear whether the prosecution power would
extend to a confidential informant as an agent of the state.

210 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3124.1 (1995) (defining sexual assault as “engag[ing] in sexual
intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with a complainant without the complainant’s consent”); Press
Release, Katie Muth, Pa. State Senator, Muth, Rabb, Krasner, and Advocates Call for Swift Passage of
No Consent in Custody (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.senatormuth.com/muth-rabb-krasner-andadvocates-call-for-swift-passage-of-no-consent-in-custody [https://perma.cc/LV3C-R28R].
211 Currently, Pennsylvania law criminalizes “institutional rape,” which is defined as sexual
contact between a corrections officer or mental health professional and an inmate, detainee, patient,
or resident. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3124.2. The introduced bills would amend this provision to add
“peace officers” to the list of potential perpetrators of institutional rape. See 2019 Pa. Laws 1164.
212 Katie Muth (Senator Katie Muth), Sen. Muth Calls for Passage of No Consent in Custody
Legislation, FACEBOOK (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=551394352323323
[https://perma.cc/LW9G-CX6T]. The bill is modeled in part off of New York legislation that passed
unanimously, supported by the NYPD, in the wake of Brooklyn detectives who claimed consent as
a defense to sexual assault charges, when they allegedly required an 18-year-old to engage in sexual
acts in order to be released. Sponsor Memo, SB S7708, 2017-18 Leg. Session (NY 2018),
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2017/s7708 [https://perma.cc/WS5M-BXH4].
213 Telephone Interview with Shea Rhodes, Esq., Director and Co-Founder of the Villanova
Law Institute to Address Commercial Sexual Exploitation (Jan. 30, 2020).
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CONCLUSION
The Pennsylvania Superior Court put an important check on outrageous
government action in Commonwealth v. Sun Cha Chon.214 But the actions taken
by police in cases like it continue.215 Particularly when officers investigate
crimes like prostitution, and disproportionately target low-income, nonwhite,
and female, trans, and nonbinary people, government resources must not be
utilized to engage in sexual contact to secure convictions. Not only is it
inappropriate and unnecessary for convictions, continuous reports of police
sexual violence prove that this power cannot and must not be trusted to law
enforcement. The Due Process Clause enables us to curb the tremendous
power at the government’s disposal when it “shocks the conscience,”216 and
protect vulnerable citizens from outrageous abuse at the hands of law
enforcement.

983 A.2d 784 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009).
See Dylan Segelbaum & Sam Ruland, Tactics in Prostitution Stings Raise Questions, ASSOC.
PRESS (May 25, 2019), https://apnews.com/42cd8231793b4ca8aa062f053484465b [https://
perma.cc/Q5EJ-ERSV] (describing a recent case in which an undercover police officer engaged in
sexual activity with an alleged sex worker before her arrest).
216 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
214
215

*

*

*

*

*

